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NOTES
CHILD SUPPORT AND WELFARE REFORM: THE
CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS OF
THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988
INTRODUCTION
While bitter ideological rivalries over the course of welfare reform almost
doomed passage of the Family Support Act of 1988,1 a broad and bipartisan
consensus formed around the Act's child support enforcement provisions. 2 Mem-
bers of Congress clashed over such controversial issues as "workfare", but few
in Congress doubted the benefits of beefing up child support laws: tougher
enforcement would ensure that support money reached deserving children and at
the same time have the important fiscal effect of reducing welfare rolls.3
Advocates of improved child support laws came to Congress armed with
startling statistics. Although some eight million families have so-called "absent
fathers" and are probably entitled to child support, only sixty percent of them,
by agreement or court award, receive child support.4 Of all the child support
orders that are issued, about one-fourth are never paid; another one-fourth are
only partially paid. 5 This unpaid child support totalled three billion dollars in
1983.6 Furthermore, support awards are often dangerously inadequate, and their
adjudication is rife with delays and procedural complications. 7
Dependent children suffer most because of poor child support enforcement.
But the resulting costs of poor enforcement are largely borne by the state welfare
systems.8 Tougher enforcement procedures promise to reduce these costs because
1. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2347 (codified as amemded in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
2. Rovner, Congress Clears Overhaul of Welfare System, Vol. 46-40 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP.
2699 (1988).
3. Rovner, Deep Schisms Still Imperil Welfare Overhaul, Vol. 46-25 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP.
1647-50 (1988).
4. Id.
5. Rovner, Child Support Provisions Are the "Engine"... Pulling Controversial Welfare Reform
Bill, Vol. 46-25 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1648 (1988), citing statistics of the United States
Bureau of the Census. These statistics include only the approximately 4.3 million families
legally entitled, by agreement or court award, to child support payments. An additional three-
and-a-half million women caring for children whose father is absent have no support awards
or agreement at all. Id. It should be pointed out, however, that of the latter group, forty-two
percent do not desire child support awards. Lerman, Child-Support Policies, in WELFARE
POLICY FOR THE 1990s 232-33 (Cottingham and Ellwood eds. 1989).
6. Williams, Guidelines for Setting Levels of Child Support, 21 FAm. L. Q. 281, 283 (Fall 1987)
(citing United States Bureau of the Census, Child Support and Alimony: 1983, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, Series P-23, No. 141 (1985)).
7. Id.
8. This is true because Aid To Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) applicants are required
to assign their child support rights to the state to qualify for AFDC benefits. 42 U.S.C. §
602(a)(26)(A), § 656 (1982). The obligated parent must then pay the support to the state. See
infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
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the additional money collected will at least partly reimburse the states for the
millions they pay out in AFDC benefits. 9 The Congressional Budget Office
estimates that the enforcement provisions of the Family Support Act will save
the welfare system over one billion dollars in the first five years after enactment.10
Enforcement provisions constitute the first title of the seven-title Family
Support Act." This prominent placement suggests a growing concern in Congress
for child welfare, but also indicates the confidence of the Act's sponsors12 that
child support enforcement has sufficient fiscal appeal to carry along more
controversial measures of the Act, such as "workfare".' 3
The highlights of the enforcement provisions include requirements that states
establish procedures for immediate wage withholding from obligor parents, 4
promulgate support award guidelines as rebuttable presumptions," establish pro-
cedures for reviewing and updating awards,' 6 and meet new federal requirements
for establishing paternity. 7 This Note examines these provisions, describes their
departure from prior law and speculates on their probable impact and success.
Finally, the Note discusses an alternative proposal for improving public assistance
to single-parent families. The Note begins with a brief history of child support
legislation in the United States.
I. THE HISTORY OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT
The federal government first became involved in child support in 1935 with
the passage of Title IV of the Social Security Act.' Although Title IV was named
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), today's conception of a
dependent child is dramatically different from that of 1935. Initially, the typical
AFDC recipient was the West Virginia coal miner's widow and her children. 9
Today, only about 3.5% of those receiving AFDC have a deceased father: divorce
accounts for 680 of single-parent families; illegitimacy another 20%; and ex-
9. In 1986, AFDC paid $15.8 billion in direct benefits to recipients; the total cost of the program
for the same year was $17.7 million. Cottingham, Introduction, in WELFARE POLICY FOR THE
1990s, supra note 5, at 2 .
10. Rovner, Deep Schisms, supra note 3, at 1649.
11. The remaining titles of the Act are devoted to, respectively, job search and skills training,
"workfare" or AFDC-UP, child care for parents participating in education and training,
demonstration projects, miscellaneous provisions and funding provisions.
12. Senator Daniel P. Moynihan (D-NY) sponsored the bill in the Senate, along with Senator
Lloyd Bentsen (D-TX). Representative Thomas J. Downey (D-NY) sponsored the bill in the
House. Rovner, Deep Schisms, supra note 3, at 1648-49.
13. "Workfare" is embodied in the AFDC-UP (unemployed parents) provision of the Act. 42
U.S.C. § 607(b) (Supp. 1989). "Workfare" requires that one parent in two-parent households
receiving welfare must work at least sixteen hours a week without pay before receiving benefits.
Id. Its inclusion was a necessary compromise without which many conservative Republicans
and the Reagan Administration would not have supported the Act. Rovner, Congress Clears
Overhaul, supra note 2.
14. See infra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
18. Act of August 14, 1935, ch. 531, Title IV, § 401, 49 Stat. 627 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
19. Welfare: Reform or Replacement?: Hearing on H.R. 1720 Before Subcommittee of Social
Security and Family Policy of the Senate Committee of Finance, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1987)
(statement of Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan, D-NY, Chairman).
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tended separation 80.20 Furthermore, while AFDC was originally conceived of
as relief for a comparatively small number of children, today it has grown to
serve over seven million children. 2'
Through the 1940s, as AFDC increasingly assisted children whose parents
had deserted them, the need for mechanisms of child support enforcement became
apparent. 22 Congress responded in 1950 by amending the Social Security Act to
require state welfare agencies to notify law enforcement officials when AFDC
was being furnished to children who had been deserted by a parent. 23
Simultaneously, among the states, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act (URESA).24 URESA and later the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act (RURESA)25 were designed to allow a custodial parent in one
state to establish and enforce a support order when the obligor parent had fled
to another state. 26 The hope was that between the 1950 amendments to the Social
Security Act and URESA, the financial burden would be lifted from AFDC and
placed where it belonged: on the obligated or deserting parent.
Despite these efforts, fathers continued to desert their children in record
numbers, and AFDC dependency grew accordingly. The 1967 amendments to
Title IV (requiring that states develop enforcement programs and adopt reciprocal
child support procedures in state courts) 27 failed because of insufficient federal
funding and supervision but also because of the continuing belief among legislators
and special interest groups that the state rather than the deserting parent should
be responsible for deserted children. 2s
The failure of the 1967 amendments inspired Congress in 1974 to again
amend the Social Security Act by adding a subtitle exclusively devoted to child
support. 29 This amendment, Title IV-D, essentially established the federal gov-
ernment as overseer, standard-bearer and benefactor of child support enforce-
ment.30 The amendment, however, left primary enforcement and administrative
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. However, even through the 1970s many states did not recognize the right of illegitimate children
to claim support from their fathers. Early efforts to place financial responsibility on absent
parents were widely rejected by welfare advocates as both unfair to the poor and inefficient
because of high administrative costs. Lerman, supra note 5, at 221.
23. Social Security Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, § 321(a)(10), 64 Stat. 549 (1950) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 602 (a)(l1) (1982)). The NOLEO (Notice to Law Enforcement Officials) amendments
were designed to bring desertion cases to the attention of local prosecutors. The NOLEO
provision was superseded by the 1975 amendments to the Social Security Act that created state
child support agencies. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
24. H. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA, THE LEAL PERSPECTIVE, 97 (1982). First approved
in 1950, URESA made support obligations binding in other states. The initiating state sends a
court-appointed petition to the state where the obligor resides. The court of the latter state
obtains jurisdiction over the obligor and conducts a hearing. If support is collected it is sent
to the initiating court, which then disburses payment to the obligee. Id.
25. All fifty states have adopted either URESA or RURESA. H. KRAUSE, id. at 96 n. 157.
26. Id.
27. Social Security Act Amendment of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 896 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 602(a)(17) (1982)).
28. H. KRAUsE, supra note 24, at 281-82. The view that deserted children are the state's responsibility
alone, even among liberal scholars, has fallen out of favor. Lerman, supra note 5, at 219-20.
29. The Child Support Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (1974) (codified as




responsibility to the states.3 Title IV-D required states to establish within their
welfare agencies departments devoted solely to child support enforcement. 32 The
federal government reimbursed states for seventy-five percent of the cost of
administering this program. Compliance was assured by periodic audits performed
by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), who was given the
authority to withhold five percent of federal AFDC funding from noncomplying
states. 33 Additionally, Title IV-D created the Federal Parent Locator Service
(FPLS) and provided the FPLS with access to federal information and agencies,
including the Internal Revenue Service and the Social Security Administration,
for use in tracking down parents owing overdue child support.3 4
Perhaps the most significant innovation of Title IV-D was its requirement
that custodial parents, in order to qualify for AFDC benefits, must first assign
their support rights to the state.3" Under this provision, the custodial parent on
AFDC received assistance from the state only; the absent parent paid his or her
financial obligation directly to the state.3 6 Thus, Title IV-D assured the state that
it would be reimbursed for its AFDC outlays to the extent it collected from the
obligated parent.3 7 In addition to assigning their child support rights to the state,
to receive AFDC benefits custodial parents were also required (1) to provide the
Social Security numbers of themselves and their dependents,3" and (2) to cooperate
with the state in naming, locating and establishing the paternity of the absent
parent.3 9
Title IV-D also made its child support enforcement program available to
custodial parents not eligible fo." AFDC.40 This program works the same as for
AFDC aplicants but with the important exception that, since no public assistance
payments are to be reimbursed, there is no assigning of support rights to the
state .4 This far-sighted provision recognized that many children not presently on
AFDC would some day find themselves there (at the expense of taxpayers) if
their support awards were not enforced.4 2
Title IV-D improved the collection of child support dramatically. 43 Yet even
its successes could not keep pace with the disintegrating American family. With
divorce and illegitimate childbirths leaving three million children in need of new




35. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(A) & § 656 (1982).
36. Id.
37. The steps the state is legally entitled to take to collect from a non-supporting parent include
garnishing wages, attaching property and initiating contempt proceedings. Id.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(25) (1982).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(B) (1982).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 652(b), (c)(3) (1982).
41. Typically, a small fee is assessed from support payments collected for the non-AFDC child.
45 C.F.R. § 302.33(c)(i) (revised as of Oct. 1, 1988).
42. LIEBERMAN, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 7 (1986).
43. Between the federal government and the states, the program collected $603 million in 1976,
$818 million in 1977 and over $1 billion in 1978. IV-D programs located almost 500,000 absent
fathers in 1978 and established paternity in over 100,000 cases. For the year 1986, IV-D
programs located over one million absent parents and established paternity in 250,000 cases.
Id. at 8.
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support orders every year, 44 existing law was still inadequate. As a result, Congress
in 1981 provided for federal tax refund intercepts when an obligor parent became
delinquent in paying child support. 4 s
In 1984, Congress again amended Title IV-D to accelerate state compliance
with the federal initiative. 46 Essentially, the 1984 amendments improved child
support enforcement by requiring the states to incorporate specific collection
procedures into the state programs. 47 Wage withholding, income tax offsets, liens
against property, security and bonding procedures all were made required weapons
of the state's arsenal against unpaid child support. 41 The 1984 law also expanded
the tax intercept program to non-AFDC families49 and required the states to
develop guidelines for determining support orders.5 0
II. THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988
A. Immediate Wage Withholding
Of the many enforcement-related provisions of the Family Support'Act,
immediate wage withholding will have the most direct and decisive impact s.5 The
1984 amendments made wage withholding mandatory only when arrears equalled
or exceeded one month's support.5 2 This procedure, while an improvement over
earlier law, was still complicated: typically, the custodial parent would have to
demonstrate that one month's arrears had in fact accrued; the obligor parent
had to be given the opportunity to respond in court; and, if necessary, a judge
would have to render a decision. The 1988 amendments circumvent this process
by ordering wage withholding immediately, at the time the support order is first
awarded.
Specifically, the new law requires that for families on welfare, beginning
November 1, 1990, the states must establish procedures so that court-ordered
child support payments are immediately withheld from the wages of the absent
parent. 3 Starting January 1, 1994 these procedures must be in place for all child
support orders regardless of whether or not the family receives AFDC assistance.5 4
Under the new law, the only exceptions to immediate withholding arise when the
44. Id.
45. Act of August 13, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 860 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 664 (1982)).
After the Department of Health and Human Services certified that an obligor parent owed
back support, the statute entitled the Internal Revenue Service to intercept and offset overdue
support against that parent's tax refund. Id.
46. Child Support Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1306, (current version
codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.(Supp. IV 1986 and Supp.1989)).
47. See generally, Note, Child Support Enforcement: Balancing Increased Federal Involvement with
Procedural Due Process, 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 687, 699-701 (1985).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 666 (Supp. 1989).
49. Id. The 1984 law also established the $50 disregard, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (Supp. 1989), through
which the first $50 of child support collected did not offset the custodial parent's AFDC
benefits. The disregard was said to have little effect on reducing welfare rolls. Lerman, supra
note 5, at 229.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 667 (Supp.1989). These guidelines, however, were not binding, a shortcoming
corrected by the Family Support Act. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 666(b)(3) (Supp. 1989).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 666(b)(3)(A) (Supp. 1989).
53. Id.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(8)(B) (Supp. 1989).
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court finds good cause or both parents, in writing, agree to an alternative
arrangement.55
Immediate wage withholding guarantees that, as long as the absent parent
is working, the family will receive child support. By collecting the money at the
start-before nonpayment is a problem-rather than later, when trouble begins,
the provision will eliminate the delay and waste of legal resources endemic to
the former system. The additional requirement that both AFDC and non-AFDC
orders are subject to immediate withholding is intended to diminish whatever
social stigma attaches to the procedure.56
Eleven states have already implemented immediate wage withholding.5 7 These
states have reduced administrative costs, increased collection, and eliminated the
lengthy period families must wait for unpaid support obligations to be judicially
enforced. 8 In other jurisdictions, support orders have been effectively enforced
through court supervision, contempt citations, and ultimately incarceration. 9
Nevertheless, immediate wage withholding promises to be doubly efficient because
it achieves the same result without resorting to such costly judicial intervention.
Immediate wage withholding had few detractors in Congress or elsewhere
when it was proposed.60 Members of Congress appreciated its efficiency and the
money it would save state welfare agencies. 61 Despite the inconvenience and
potential embarrassment that wage withholding may cause the obligor parent,
such drawbacks seem tolerable when weighed against the many benefits of
ensuring the swift and complete payment of child support.
B. Support Award Guidelines
Like immediate wage withholding, the new requirements for support award
guidelines62 promise to bring greater efficiency and certainty to the law of child
55. 42 U.S.C. § 666(b)(3)(A) (Supp. 1989).
56. Previously, it was argued that obligor parents were humiliated when wages were withheld.
Since withholding formerly took place only when arrearages accrued, the obligor's employer
inevitably knew about the nonpayment. Rovner, Deep Schisms, supra note 3, at 1649. Under
the new system, this problem is eliminated because the wages of all obligor parents are withheld.
57. A.B.A. National Legal Resource Center for Child Adovcacy and Protection, Dec. 27, 1988,
at 7. These states are California, Wisconsin, Illinois, Massachusetts, Florida, Ohio, Texas,
Arizona, Minnesota, Kentucky, and Hawaii.
58. Id.
59. Note, Earned Income Credits are Protected From the Tax Refund Interception Mehtod of
Child Support Collection, 51 BKLYN. L. REv. 1169, 1204 n. 174 (1985).
60. One exception was advocates of father's groups. They contended-persuasively-that much
child support legislation perpetuates the societal perception that absent fathers are unreliable
and will not meet support obligations without state supervision. The Act addressed this criticism,
to some extent, by reversing laws that prevented fathers from initiating paternity suits, and by
naming the obligor parent (though it is almost always the father) as a unisex class. 42 U.S.C.
§ 666(a)(5)(B) (Supp. 1989). Father's groups specifically oppose immediate wage withholding
because it is said to (1) endanger the father's job or work status, (2) take away his leverage
for visitation, and, (3) since more child support will arrive from state agencies under the new
law, give the child the impression that the state and not the absent father is its supporter. In
response to these criticisms, defenders of immediate withholding point out that (1) it violates
federal law and the law of most states to fire someone simply because they are subject to wage
withholding and (2) child support as leverage for visitation is almost universally despised
because it puts the parent's interests above the child's. Rovner, Deep Schisms, supra note 3,
at 1649.
61. Rovner, Congress Clears Overhaul, supra note 2.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2) (Supp. 1989).
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support. Prior law required states to promulgate guidelines for support awards,
but these standards were not binding on state decision-makers. 63 The Family
Support Act requires that by October, 1989, states establish support guidelines
as a rebuttable presumption which can only be overcome by the decision-maker's
written findings or oral findings made on the record. 64 Thus, while limiting the
courts' discretion, the new law permits courts the flexibility to tailor awards to
individual circumstances.
Although Congress requires the guidelines to be mandatory, the states
themselves must formulate these guidelines. 6 The often complex criteria by which
the states have figured support awards are beyond the scope of this Note;
however, both the criteria used and the resulting awards vary widely between
states. 66 In this respect, despite federal guidelines, states retain a great deal of
discretion in managing child support awards.
Mandatory guidelines as a rebuttable presumption assure consistent treatment
of similarly situated parties within an individual state. They also eliminate the
inefficient and inequitable adjudication that prevails in the absence of uniform
standards. 67 It is less clear whether mandatory guidelines will increase the dollar
amount of support awards which, according to one study, presently provide
support (on the average) at only eighty percent of the poverty level. 68
To some extent, if a state favors low support awards, the new law cannot
compel the state to change. 69 However, mandatory guidelines may tend to increase
support amounts, since some state agencies may be disinclined to promulgate
standards far below the poverty level. 70
C. Updating Support Guidelines
The Family Support Act also promises to improve the methods by which
child support orders are updated. By October 1, 1990, the states must establish
procedures whereby the state or either parent can initiate review of a child support
order. 7' By October 1, 1993 the states must implement a process for the periodic
review of child support orders.72 This review is required to take place within
63. 42 U.S.C. § 667(b) (Supp. 1989).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2) (Supp. 1989). To depart from the guidelines, the judge's finding must
explain why application of the guidelines would be unfair or inappropriate. The Act additionally
requires that every four years the states must review their mandatory guidelines to ensure that
they yield appropriate awards. Id.
65. Id.
66. Williams, supra note 6, at 290-304.
67. Lerman, supra note 5, at 236.
68. Williams, supra note 6, at 321.
69. One study concluded that since most support orders are below the levels of AFDC benefits,
even full payment of such orders would leave most mothers on welfare. Lerman, supra note
5, at 231.
70. Indiana, for instance, adopted an Income Shares support order system based on a model used
in Delaware. 542 N.E.2d LX-XCIV (No.2)(1989). The early indications are that since the new
guidelines have gone into effect in October, 1989, award amounts have risen. Whether higher
orders result in higher collections remains to be seen. Id.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(10)(B) (Supp. 1989).
72. Exceptions to this rule are 1) when, consistent with federal regulations, the state determines
that review would not be in the best interests of the child and 2) when the case is non-AFDC
and neither parent requests a review. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(10)(B)(i-ii) (Supp. 1989).
1990]
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three years after the order is established, and if necessary the order must be
adjusted according to the state's guidelines. 73
The updating procedure provision of the new law effectively addresses the
"shortfall" of support awards which arises when factors such as inflation, higher
costs of caring for older children, and changing incomes of parents make the
original award insufficient. Yet if updating is to become the regular procedure
envisioned by the Act, great expenditures will be necessary, both in expanding
personnel within state agencies and in creating or improving the computerization
of child support records.74 In most cases, state agencies are barely able to keep
up with cases as they arise; lacking the manpower and money to regularly review
old awards, the initiating of updating has typically been left to the parties
concerned."
Despite the wisdom of requiring that orders be updated, states will not be
able to afford these innovations without federal help. The Act does not make
explicit how states will meet the costs of these requirements. Possibly, the
substantial savings from immediate wage withholding will provide additional
funds. Without such funding, at any rate, the federal requirements will be very
difficult to implement.
D. Paternity Establishment
The Act improves paternity establishment by increasing federal funding and
raising minimum standards of state compliance. In general, the Act requires
states to establish paternity in a specified percentage of its welfare cases or risk
losing certain federal assistance.7 6 The law also increases federal matching funds
for genetic testing of paternity from sixty-seven percent to ninety percent 77 and
allows for genetic testing to be initiated by either parent. 78 Finally, the new law
encourages states to adopt simple civil procedures for acknowledging paternity. 79
Despite the obvious benefits of these amendments, high costs to states with
low prospects for financial returns limit their impact. Since the absent parent in
a paternity action is often poor and unable to provide any support to dependent
children, the necessary lab testing and adjudication to prove paternity may, in
some cases, cost more than these procedures are worth.
E. Additional Provisions
The Family Support Act also makes more federal information available to
state parent locator services. In particular, the Act makes available Department
of Labor information, including wage and unemployment records. 80 The Act
73. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(10)(B) (Supp. 1989).
74. Parnas and Cermak, Rethinking Child Support, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 759, 764-766 (1989).
75. Id.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 652(g)(1) (Supp. 1989). The percentage must be either (1) 50% of all pertinent
state enforced cases, (2) equal to or exceeding the average for all states, or 3) increase by 3%
between 1988 and 1991. Id.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 655(a)(1)(C) (Supp. 1989).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(B) (Supp. 1989). This unisex provision undermines the alleged discrimi-
nation against the father who sought to establish his paternity against the mother's wishes. Id.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 668(a)(2) (Supp. 1989).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 653(c)(3). Presently, FPLS accesses records of the Social Security Administration,
the Veteran's Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, the Selective Service and other
federal entities.
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further requires states in issuing birth certificates to obtain each parent's Social
Security number."s Additionally, the Act establishes a Commission on Interstate
Child Support, which by 1991 must report to Congress its recommendations for
improving interstate child suport and for revising URESA.82 Finally, the Act
commissions a demonstration project to examine ways of improving parental
visitation.83
III. THE ASSURED BENEFITS SYSTEM: A RECOMMENDATION
The child support provisions of the Family Support Act may only modestly
reduce welfare rolls. Since support awards are regularly far below the poverty
level, even their total enforcement will not move those presently on welfare to
self-sufficiency.8 4 However, higher support awards accompanying improved en-
forcement will achieve more substantial results.8 5
Unfortunately, the Act does not promise to significantly increase child
support awards. 86 Although the Act wisely requires the states to promulgate
support guidelines, it leaves the states free to set guidelines at sub-poverty levels.87
If the new law fails to produce increases in support order amounts in the states,
Congress' next step should be to establish minimum support levels. Where
applicable, this minimum level should be based on a flat percentage of the
father's income.88
A leading alternative to AFDC is the Child Support Assurance System
(CSAS).8 9 This assured benefit approach would set a minimal support level9° and
pay the mother the difference between that level and the father's support
payments. 9' Thus, if the minimum level is set at $2000 a year for the first child
and only $1000 is collected from the absent father, the assured benefit would be
$1000 for that year.
CSAS is not means-tested. Thus, assured benefits would be guaranteed to
all custodial parents regardless of income. It also does not decrease benefits if
the custodial parent becomes a wage-earner. 92 The system is based not on a
81. 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(2) (Supp. 1989).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 666 (Supp. 1989).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (Supp. 1989).
84. Lerman, supra note 5, at 245-46.
85. Id.
86. See supra note 69-70 and accompanying text.
87. Id.
88. See generally, Williams, supra note 6
89. Lerman, supra note 5, 235-246. See also Garfinkle and Uhr, A New Approach to Child
Support,75 PUBLIC INTEREST 111-22 (Spring 1984); Lerman, Separating Income Support from
Income Supplementation, 17 J. INST. SOCbOECON. STUD. 101-25 (Autumn 1985).
90. Scholars differ as to what this minimum should be. The Wisconsin demonstration project of
CSAS, which was developed by Irving Garfinkle, puts yearly benefits at over $3,000 a year
for the first child. Lerman, however, argues for far more modest benefits of approximately
$1,100 a year for the first child. Lerman contends that high benefits cost states too much in
initial outlays, that the temptation for fraud through parental collusion is too great, and that
the incentive to work is diminished because it is almost as profitable not to work and merely
collect benefits. Furthermore, Lerman's more austere version of assured benefits is of far
greater political appeal. Lerman, supra note 5, at 238-39.
91. Id. at 237.
92. Id. Lerman advocates a wage subsidy of approximately one dollar an hour, which would
further increase the incentive of poor mothers to enter the labor force. Id.
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mother's inability to support her children (as in AFDC), but instead on the
shortfall of either the existing support award or the father's nonpayment of that
award.
As a general rule, assured benefits would most improve the circumstances
of middle-class custodial mothers. These mothers would be guaranteed a minimal
level of support even when the absent father fails to pay. Superficially, poor
mothers appear no better off under an assured benefits system, since AFDC
benefits already reliably arrive every month under existing law. The key advantage
of assured benefits, however, is that everyone (and not just the poor) receives
them when child support collection falls below the assured benefit minimum. 93
Thus, like Social Security, assured benefits would be "a middle-class program
with a redistributive element and no stigma attached." 94 Another advantage of
CSAS is that it provides incentives for custodial mothers (rich or poor) to work
because under CSAS there is no AFDC-style loss of benefits with increased
income.
The assured benefits system can be distinguished from entitlement programs
because its benefits are only activated when collection or enforcement fail. 95
Thus, no one is entitled to or guaranteed any benefits unless the collection
mechanism breaks down. Furthermore, since CSAS requires neither income nor
asset tests and is not targeted at a particular income group, its recipients experience
none of the stigmatization that attaches to AFDC recipients. 96 Finally, the
elimination of asset tests reduces administrative costs.
Under a CSAS system, some government money will flow to nonpoor
families. Yet if the assured benefit minimum is kept comparatively low, outlays
will not substantially increase and the long-term reduction of dependency will
ultimately reduce costs.97
The more difficult problem with CSAS is how to handle custodial mothers
who neither have nor want support awards. Costs, of course, are kept low by
excluding these mothers from CSAS. But such a policy would leave many families
without public assistance or, if AFDC is retained for these families (as would be
likely), such a policy would do little to reduce welfare rolls.98 The best policy
would be to make CSAS universally available but with improved incentives for
custodial mothers to seek support awards.99
93. Id.
94. Ellwood, Conclusion, in WELFARE POLICY FOR THE 1990s, supra note 5, at 284.
95. Lerman, supra note 5, at 237. The primary criticism of assured benefits systems is that they
are different breeds of the same AFDC-entitlement animal. This is true to the extent CSAS
recipients will be. mostly poor. But the important selling point of CSAS-both for politicians
and the public-is that benefits are only paid when no collection is made. With this emphasis
on collection should come heightened awareness of the importance of enforcement in reducing
welfare dependency. Id.
96. W.J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 152 (1987).
97. Id. at 152-53.
98. Lerman, supra note 5, at 239.
99. One such incentive under the AFDC system is its disregard of the first fifty dollars collected
from the absent father; thus, when full support is collected by the state, the custodial mother
receives the full AFDC monthly benefit and fifty dollars. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (Supp. 1989).
Another is the good faith requirement that the mother help locate the absent father. Lerman,
supra note 5, at 239. States might also consider slightly decreasing benefits for mothers who
do not attempt to obtain awards.
200 [Vol. 16:191
Child Support and Welfare Reform
Assured benefit systems have succeeded in many European countries and
Israel.l°° Wisconsin has implemented a child support demonstration project which
includes an assured benefit program. This program is expected to reduce AFDC
rolls by fifteen percent while slightly reducing administrative and outlay costs.' 0'
CSAS has the important practical advantage of encouraging welfare mothers
to work without diminishing their benefits, and the important psychological
advantage of destigmatizing assistance to needy families. Furthermore, since
effective CSAS depends on strict enforcement, any assured benefit system also
signals absent fathers that they are responsible for supporting their children.
CONCLUSION
The Family Support Act and earlier legislation toughening child support
enforcement demonstrate a growing awareness in Congress that cracking down
on deserting parents saves states money and creates a better life for dependent
children. Tough enforcement may even keep families together, since fathers may
be less inclined to leave if they know their obligations will follow them across
town, even across country. Improved enforcement may benefit dependent children
not on AFDC most: now their support checks are guaranteed to arrive so long
as the obligor parent is working. (Welfare children do not experience this
uncertainty because their support arrives, reliably, from the state.)
As an early chapter in welfare reform, the Family Support Act is a welcome
improvement. Yet it must be recognized as a beginning; advocates of more drastic
reforms should not deem the Act a failure if it does not reduce welfare depend-
ency. Programs requiring paternity establishment and updating of support awards
are important but must provide for sufficient federal funding. Immediate wage
withholding is an effective tool of enforcement, but will be most effective if
accompanied by higher support awards.
The next chapter in welfare reform should be the enactment of an assured
benefit system to replace AFDC. Unlike present public assistance, CSAS has no
built-in work disincentive and does not stigmatize its recipients. Despite initial
cost increases, CSAS will effectively reduce long-term welfare costs. Finally,
CSAS promises to do what AFDC has failed to do: return its recipients to self-
sufficiency. To the extent that the Family Support Act lays a foundation for
future reforms such as CSAS, its passage may be the beginning of the end of
welfare dependency.
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